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LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON
UNITED STATES TRADE INITIATIVES
AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Lawrence S. Liu*
I. INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1980s marked an era of rapid growth in bilateral
trade and economic relations between the United States and the Re-
public of China [ROC].' When the United States severed diplomatic
relations with the ROC in late 1978, total bilateral trade then was just
over U.S. $7 billion, representing about thirty percent of ROC's total
trade. By the end of 1988, bilateral trade still represented about one-
third of Taiwan's global trade, but the total amount of bilateral trade
had exceeded U.S. $36 billion.2 While the ROC has become the sixth
largest trading partner of the United States and the thirteenth largest
trading country in the world in its own right, its trade surplus with the
U.S. has also steadily widened to the order of U.S. $10.42 billion in
1988.1 For the first ten months of 1989, the ROC's overall trade sur-
plus has increased, still including a significant trade surplus with the
United States. 4 As its trade and budget deficits increased, naturally
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Pennsylvania, 1980; LL.B., National Taiwan University, 1977. The author wishes to acknowl-
edge the research assistance of Charles Comey, J.D. 1991 (expected), UCLA, but remains re-
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I. The ROC on Taiwan now has a population of 20 million and a per capita income exceed-
ing U.S. $8,000. Its recent economic achievements are accompanied by recent political reforms
as well. Politically, the late President Chiang Ching-Kuo swiftly ushered in many liberalization
and reform programs before his death in 1988. They included permission to form the first oppo-
sition party (the Democratic Progressive Party), lifting martial law, relinquishing control of
newspaper publishing, allowing ROC citizens to visit relatives on the Chinese mainland, and the
proposal to rejuvenate its three houses of "Congress" (that is, the Legislative Yuan, the National
Assembly and the Control Yuan). Socially, Taiwan has become a more open and pluralistic
society. See TAIWAN: A NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED STATE (H. Hsiao, W. Cheng & H. Chan eds.
1989); see also Harrison, Taiwan after Chiang Ching-Kuo, 73 FOREIGN POL'Y 790 (1988). For a
succinct update of the bilateral trade relations, see BOARD OF FOREIGN TRADE, THE ROC-USA
TRADE RELATIONS (1989) [hereinafter TRADE RELATIONS].
2. BOARD OF FOREIGN TRADE, '89 FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 24 [hereinafter FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT].
3. For 1988, export to the United States represented 38.7% of Taiwan's total export, and
import from the U.S. represented 26.2% of total imports to Taiwan. Id.
4. According to ROC statistics, the first ten months of 1989 registered an overall trade sur-
plus of U.S. $11.72 billion (a 36% increase from the same period in 1988), representing U.S.
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the United States has become more protectionist.5 Not surprisingly,
U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade issues not only have occupied the
forefront of their bilateral relations, but also have received increasing
academic attention.
6
This article examines the legal and policy perspectives of U.S.
trade initiatives toward the ROC in the last decade and their impact
on economic liberalization in Taiwan. Part I sets forth the basic legal,
policy and structural framework of this bilateral trade relationship.
Part II is a sectoral retrospect of the major bilateral trade issues dealt
with in the last decade. Part III presents an analysis of the' recent
efforts of the ROC to liberalize its trading system and economy, the
primary issues and prospects of such liberalization, and their causal
relations with American trade initiatives toward Taiwan. Part IV con-
cludes with the author's cautious optimism for prosperous U.S.-ROC
trade relatipns in the next decade.
II. BASIC FRAMEWORK OF BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS
One could classify the basic legal framework governing U.S.-ROC
trade and economic relations under three categories: treaty laws; inter-
nal laws and regulations of the United States; and internal laws, poli-
cies and regulations of the ROC. Treaty laws are a result of past trade
negotiations and they are highly relevant in the further development of
bilateral trade relations. U.S. trade laws are the driving force behind
the formation of the treaty laws and the emerging jurisprudence on
trade regulation in the ROC, which has just begun to receive wider
attention in recent years.
7
$43.65 billion of imports (a 5.4% increase from the same period in 1988), and U.S. $55.37 billion
of exports (a 10.6% increase from the same period in 1988). Exports to the U.S. as of the end of
October, 1989 were U.S. $20.17 billion (representing 36.4% of total exports from Taiwan), and
imports from the U.S. were U.S. $9.94 billion (representing 22.8% of total imports into Taiwan),
indicating a trade surplus of U.S. $10.23 billion. Com. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, at 1. According to
U. S. statistics, the first nine months of 1989 resulted in a total trade surplus of U.S. $10.4 billion
for Taiwan, a 37% increase from the same period in 1988. If the gold imports to the U.S. in 1988
are excluded, however, its total trade surplus for the first nine months of 1989 remained approxi-
mately the same as compared with the same period in 1988. Excluding such gold imports from
1988 imports, the bilateral trade imbalance for the first nine months of 1989 actually improved
by 14.5%. See Translation of U.S. Treasury Report on Taiwan's Currency Conversion Rate, Com.
Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at 3.
5. It has been suggested that under President Ronald Reagan, the United States actually
reached its protectionist peak after World War II. See Truell, Watch What I Do, The Wall St. J.
Rep., Sept. 22, 1989, at R27.
6. See, e.g., J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, BEYOND RECRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-
TAIWAN TRADE TENSIONS (1987) [hereinafter BEYOND RECRIMINATION]; M. LASATER, U.S.-
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ECONOMIC ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1987).
7. See, e.g., Liu, Experimenting with Competition Law.- A Preliminary Analysis of the Draft
Fair Trade Law of Taiwan, The Republic of China, 13 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 5
(1989) [hereinafter ROC Fair Trade Law Analysis]; L. LIU, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION,
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A. Treaty Law Framework
The year 1979 is an appropriate watershed with which to review
the treaty law framework for U.S.-ROC trade relations; the severance
of formal diplomatic relations, announced by President Jimmy Carter
on December 15, 1978, became official on January 1, 1979.8 The three
decades prior to 1979 had seen close economic, political, and diplo-
matic ties between the U.S. and the ROC which had been reluctantly
re-established in the early 1950's. The principal legal instrument gov-
erning bilateral trade and economic relations has been the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation [FCN Treaty] between the two
countries, signed in Nanking in 1946.9 Other sources of bilateral
treaty law are embodied in various trade agreements and the exchange
of letters between the American Institute in Taiwan [AIT],' 0 a District
of Columbia corporation chartered under the Taiwan Relations Act
[TRA] and serving as the unofficial United States embassy, and the
Coordination Council for North American Affairs [CCNAA], an
ROC government agency established in 1979 to conduct bilateral rela-
tions with the United States.
1. FCN Treaty
Not different from other FCN treaties established between the U.S.
and its allies, the 1946 FCN Treaty was entered into after World War
II to replace the unequal treaties binding the ROC as a successor to
the Imperial Chinese government. It was also the most important bi-
lateral agreement that survived the severance of diplomatic relations
in 1979.11 But the FCN Treaty is significant in conducting the bilat-
eral relations not merely because of its political and symbolic
meanings.
The FCN Treaty sets forth general principles of national treatment
and non-discrimination of persons, property, and entities of the other
Contracting Party. While the ROC Constitution requires that respect
(REPUBLIC OF CHINA - TAIWAN), Pt. 3, sec. 1.02 (J. Von Kalinowski ed. 1986) [hereinafter
WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION]; Liu, Brave New World of Financial Reform in Taiwan, the
Republic of China: Three Waves of Internationalization and Liberalization and Beyond, 8 CHI-
NESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. n.345 (1988-89) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Financial Reform in the
ROC].
8. J. CARTER, PUBLIC PAPERS 2264-68 (1978).
9. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, United States-Republic of
China, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (1948).
10. Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West 1989). For a discussion of the TRA,
see Javits, Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 54
(1981); ROC-U.S. RELATIONS UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: PRACTICE AND PROS-
PECTS (K. Chang ed. 1988).
11. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(c) (West 1989).
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be accorded to treaties, it does not specifically provide what takes pre-
cedence when a treaty conflicts with inconsistent domestic legisla-
tion.1 2 Nonetheless, the High Court for the Province of Taiwan has
relied on provisions of the FCN Treaty to grant U.S. corporations ac-
cess in court, despite inconsistent domestic legislation. The Court did
not even discuss as an issue the severance of diplomatic relations. 13
Therefore, the prevailing view of the executive and judicial branches of
the ROC is that the FCN Treaty continues to create binding interna-
tional legal obligations capable of being enforced by the judiciary. At
least one American court has reached the same conclusion, upholding
the validity of the FCN Treaty after 1979 as well as the constitutional-
ity of the TRA. 1
4
The FCN Treaty has also been useful in a trade negotiating con-
text. This is particularly interesting in light of a provision of the pro-
tocol to the FCN Treaty excluding its applicability with respect to
measures required or permitted by the General Agreement on Tariff
and Trade [GATT]. 5 In this context, the national treatment provi-
sions of the FCN Treaty need not be legalistically or precisely relevant
to the trade issues being discussed. In contrast, judicial scrutiny
would require a higher standard of such relevance. American trade
pressures being what they are, however, the national treatment princi-
ples embodied in the FCN Treaty persuasively supported arguments
for market access to U.S. firms, particularly those in the service sector
such as banking, insurance, and securities.' 6
In a similar vein, one should analyze the international legal effect
12. ROC Const. art. 141. See Chiu, The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties,
Agreements and Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Chinese Law, 7 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L.
L. & AFF. 1, 16 (1987-88).
13. See Taiwan High Court Criminal Judgment (Ref. No. 72-Shang-SSu-806, Mar. 15, 1983)
(FCN Treaty held to grant Apple Computer, a company not recognized to do business in the
ROC, access to court as a complainant in a case involving the criminal infringement of its com-
puter programs); Taiwan High Court Criminal Judgment (Ref. No. 76-Shang-Yi-5672, Feb. 28,
1987) (FCN Treaty held to take precedence over an inconsistent provision of the 1985 Copyright
Law of the ROC, which requires registration of a foreign work of authorship as a precondition
for copyright protection in Taiwan); accord Criminal Judgment of the Taipei District Court of
Taiwan (Ref. No. 77-Yi-2574, Sept. 22, 1988), reported in 7 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 262;
see also Chiu, supra note 12, at 13-16.
14. New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 2 Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) 26,398 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See Statement of Interest of the United States in that case,
reported in 7 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 216 (1987-88); see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(c) (West
1989).
15. See Diplomatic Note by U.S. Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart to ROC Minister for For-
eign Affairs, Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh (Nov. 29, 1948), 63 Stat. 1299, 1393. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, 194.
16. See Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7; see also UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT SUBMISSION TO THE GATT, U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN SERVICES (1984).
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of the FCN Treaty in a non-legalistic way. While this approach may
not apply to FCN treaties between the United States and other signa-
tories, political reality may necessitate such an approach for the U.S.-
ROC FCN Treaty. For instance, article XXVIII of the FCN Treaty
provides for the resolution of disputes and different interpretations of
treaty provisions by the International Court of Justice.17 Despite this
clear provision in the FCN Treaty, such a third-party dispute mecha-
nism is no longer feasible.
Excluding the application of GATT measures from the FCN
Treaty was considered entirely proper for several reasons. First, both
the U.S. and the ROC were prepared to participate actively in an or-
ganization that was to become the International Trade Organization.
Therefore, the preferred approach to resolving trade issues for both
countries was multilateralism. The ROC was an original contracting
party to the GATT, but withdrew in the 1940's for political and prac-
tical reasons. Second, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to provide for the results of intensive trade negotiations in FCN trea-
ties or their protocols; FCN treaties are intended only to set forth gen-
eral principles.
The ROC's withdrawal from the GATT had its consequences.
First, Taiwan could only opt for bilateral trade negotiations [BTNs],
rather than becoming a participant in multilateral trade negotiations
[MTNs]. Second, lack of access to any official international trade or-
ganization and the unfavorable political and diplomatic environment
the ROC has encountered also have made BTNs a difficult and piece-
meal process for the ROC. For example, both pressure from the Peo-
ple's Republic of China [PRC] and fewer ties with Europe have made
it more difficult, at least until recent years, for the ROC to conduct
trade consultations with European countries, especially with the Euro-
pean Economic Community [EEC]. Similarly, Taiwan has had to con-
duct sectoral BTNs by a piecemeal approach.
2. Trade Agreements and Exchange of Letters
Another important corpus of treaty law affecting trade and eco-
nomic relations between the U.S. and the ROC is the various trade
agreements and exchange of letters between the AIT and the CCNAA
and their respective predecessors.1 8 It has been suggested that under
the TRA, agreements concluded between the AIT and the CCNAA
17. 63 Stat. 1299, 1321.
18. Their pre-1979 predecessors were the Office for the Special Representative for Trade Ne-
gotiations and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. These trade agreements and exchange of letters
may be found in the Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs.
[Vol. 11:326
U.S.-Taiwan Trade
"have full force and effect under the law of the United States."1 9
These agreements may relate to overall tariff reductions. But as the
focus of the BTNs in recent years has shifted to the imposition or
removal of non-tariff barriers [NTBs], these agreements have become
increasingly sectoral.
The first of such agreements was entered into pursuant to an ex-
change of letters made on December 28, 1978, just four days before
the severance of bilateral diplomatic relations.20 The agreement
sought to implement the results of U.S. tariff concessions made in the
Tokyo Round of the MTNs under the GATT framework in considera-
tion of tariff concessions to be made by the ROC. More important, it
also committed the ROC to:
observe obligations substantially the same as those applicable to develop-
ing countries set forth in the non-tariff agreements concluded in the To-
kyo Round, including agreements on subsidies and countervailing duties,
customs valuation, licensing, government procurement, commercial
counterfeiting, and technical barriers to trade.
21
The same commitment was reaffirmed in another exchange of letters
made on October 24, 1979.22 Annex II to the December 28, 1978 ex-
change of letters set forth the ROC's non-tariff concessions in more
detail; some of these concessions were to become the focal point of
further clarification, expansion, and dispute. Among Other conces-
sions, the ROC committed to:
23
(1) use its best efforts to secure the legislative authority to eliminate the
20 percent customs valuation uplift within five to six years;
(2) give favorable consideration to taking appropriate liberalization
measures regarding all non-tariff measures applied to imports of ap-
ples and automobiles;
(3) give favorable consideration to allowing imports of products contain-
ing ingredients acceptable in the U.S. but not admitted to the ROC
at the time, subject to appropriate health and sanitary safeguards;
(4) allow U.S. firms to open branch offices to sell life insurance policies
to all U.S. nationals in Taiwan;
(5) allow U.S. firms to open branch offices to sell property insurance
policies, except marine insurance, for property of U.S. nationals and
entities (but ruling out the joint venture alternative);
19. See 45 Fed. Reg. 34,483 (1980), cited in 1 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 194 (1981);
Chiu, supra note 12, at 20.
20. See Exchange of letters between Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, U.S. Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations, and Political Vice Minister Yi-ting Wong of the ROC's Ministry of
Economic Affairs (Dec. 29, 1978), reprinted in 30 U.S.T. 6440, T.I.A.S. No. 9561.
21. Id. at 6440.
22. See Exchange of letters between Representative Konsin C. Shah of the CCNAA and
Chairman David Dean of the AIT (Oct. 24, 1979), reprinted in 1 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. AND
AFF. 196 (1981).
23. See Exchange of letters, supra note 20, at 6467, 6468.
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(6) take a whole host of actions to prevent the imitation of foreign
trademarks. 24
The October 24, 1979 agreement also set forth the understanding
that the U.S. and the ROC would continue discussions at a mutually
convenient date to define bilateral obligations and an appropriate dis-
pute settlement mechanism for matters falling within the purview of
the non-tariff measures mentioned in the agreement.
25
The meaning of these early agreements is therefore important in
several ways. First, in retrospect these agreements highlighted the fo-
cal point of trade disputes in the coming decade: implementation of
the various codes resulting from the Tokyo Round MTNs, the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, and market access for U.S. firms
offering financial services. Second, subsequent BTNs showed that
vaguely worded and terse commitments are susceptible to multiple in-
terpretations which could result in further trade tensions. Third, the
limited, sectoral application of the agreements reflected the lower level
of U.S. concern at the time. As the U.S. trade deficit with Taiwan
increased, U.S. trade initiatives toward Taiwan tended to have a
broader scope. Fourth, as a result of BTNs, these agreements have to
be applied on the basis of non-discrimination, a fundamental principle
governing MTNs. They, therefore, constitute a vicarious vehicle for
integrating the ROC into the MTN framework. Fifth, most of these
trade agreements, as well as later trade agreements, are not self-imple-
menting in the ROC; some domestic legislative or regulatory measures
have to be adopted. Gradually, they contributed to the emergence of a
more sophisticated trade regulatory jurisprudence and, more impor-
tantly, economic liberalization in the ROC.
B. Internal Laws and Regulations of the United States
The second source of law in basic U.S.-ROC trade relations is the
24. Id. at 6468. ROC manufacturers copying foreign trademarks by registering them in the
ROC would have to be prosecuted pursuant to the ROC Criminal Code. The Board of Foreign
Trade [BOFT], the ROC trade regulatory agency, committed itself to prohibiting them from
exporting the products in question. Those who imitate foreign trademarks not yet registered in
the ROC should also be prosecuted if they are suspected of committing the offense of illegally
showing the trademark and the place of origin. The ROC committed itself to encourage its
manufacturers to develop their own trademarks and seek foreign registration. The ROC also
resolved to wage an educational campaign through industry associations on responsible trade-
mark practice. The National Bureau of Standards [NBS], the ROC's patent and trademark of-
fice, agreed to refuse application to any trademark closely similar to a foreign trademark and to
refer the case for possible prosecution. Finally, the ROC agreed to amend its Trademark Law to
punish accessories to trademark counterfeiting, impose more severe punishment for trademark
counterfeiting, and confiscate counterfeit products.
25. See Exchange of letters between Representative Konsin C. Shah of the CCNAA and
Chairman David Dean of the AIT (Oct. 24, 1978), reprinted in I CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF.
197 (1981).
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internal laws and regulations of the United States. The TRA, enacted
in April, 1979 after diplomatic ties were severed, has been the basis for
the U.S. to conduct bilateral relations with Taiwan. Most of the other
internal laws and regulations are trade legislation found in Title 19 of
the U.S. Code as amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930, the most im-
portant of which are the Trade Act of 1974,26 the Trade and Agree-
ment Act of 1979,27 the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,28 and the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.29
1. The TRA
The TRA is an exercise in legislating defacto foreign relations. At
least one U.S. court has recognized such de facto recognition. 30 In a
medical malpractice suit filed by a citizen of the ROC involving diver-
sity jurisdiction, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that the defendant could not reject the claim on the
ground that the plaintiff was not a citizen "of a foreign state" recog-
nized by the United States. The Court decided that a "de facto recog-
nition standard" would satisfy the foreign diversity jurisdiction
requirement, stating "we find such recognition here."'31 In subsequent
cases, it has been held that the TRA intended to continue the provi-
sions of the FCN Treaty in force between the United States and Tai-
wan. 32 It is expected that the TRA will continue to serve as the
bedrock for the U.S. and Taiwan to enhance a variety of bilateral rela-
tions, including trade.
2. Trade Legislation
Individual cases based on antidumping, countervailing, import re-
lief (section 232), and unfair competition (section 337) provisions of
the U.S. trade legislation reflect the micro-aspect of the bilateral trade
frictions. 33 The focus of the American trade legislation as applied to
Taiwan, however, has shifted to retaliatory provisions such as section
26. 19 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (1974).
27. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
28. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
29. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1121 (1988).
30. Chang v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 506 F.Supp. 975, 978 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
31. Id.
32. International Audio-Visual Communications v. Chen, Civ. 84-2328-DWW (MCX) (C.D.
Cal. 1984); New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, 2 Copy L. Rep. (CCH)
26,398 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
33. See, e.g., Stoltenberg, Subsidies under United States Countervailing Duty Law: the Case of
Taiwan, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 138 (1988).
Winter 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
301 and "Super 301.''34 As the overall U.S. trade deficits and trade
deficits with Taiwan increased, one finds that the more recent trade
legislation has reduced executive discretion and increased legislative
oversight, such as hearings and ongoing mandatory reporting.
Reflecting the protectionist sentiments in the U.S. in an election
year and seeking to balance them with themes to preserve fair trade,
the 1988 trade act has become more legalistic than previous trade acts.
As a result, U.S. trade negotiators now bring a much more detailed
and demanding agenda before their ROC counterparts. Under the ru-
bric of Section 301, the American pressure upon foreign governments
to grant greater market access and to intensify enforcement against
infringement of intellectual property rights has intruded upon the do-
mestic matters of foreign governments, the ROC included.
C. Internal Laws, Policies, and Regulations of the ROC
The third source of law in the trading framework of the bilateral
trade relations is internal ROC laws, policies, and regulations, to be
discussed in detail below. Its coverage ranges widely from tariff reduc-
tions, custom valuations, import and export regulation and programs,
foreign exchange control, insurance, banking, securities, shipping, in-
tellectual property rights, competition laws, agricultural and fishery
policies, and government procurement, to inward and outward invest-
ment policies. These topics dovetail with the shopping list in the U.S.
trade legislation discussed above.35 The ROC's approach to this
corpus of legal and regulatory materials, however, is entirely different
from U.S. trade legislation.
From a western perspective, the ROC government has taken a
somewhat interventionist approach to national development in Tai-
wan. 36 In an earlier stage of this process, emergency legislation ena-
bled the government to exercise wide discretion in directing economic
policies. Policies virtually became law. Furthermore, some delays usu-
ally occurred during the political process that transformed administra-
tive policies into adminsistratve regulations and then administrative
regulations into enacted legislation. 37 To some extent, the same pro-
cess applies when the ROC adopts measures to respond to U.S. trade
demands. To be sure, intervention in the economy by the ROC gov-
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 et seq. (1980).
35. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SUBMISSION TO GATT, supra note 16, appendix III, at 123.
36. See L. Liu, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION, supra note 7, at § 1.01(2).
37. The regulation of the securities market and foreign exchange control in Taiwan are two
examples. See Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at text accompanying note 138.
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ernment has been less pervasive than that in Japan or Korea.38 Never-
theless, the regulatory apparatus resulting from such intervention
necessarily creates bureaucratic inertia and time lags in the decision-
making process for responsive trade measures. This is particularly so
when recent BTNs have become a prelude to domestic deregulation, a
difficult task in an over-regulated environment.
D. Structural Differences in Bilateral Trade Relations
Most economists would agree that the U.S.-Taiwan trade imbal-
ance is largely a result of an American macroeconomic imbalance
which has caused, among other things, huge budget deficits. 39 To be
sure, one should not discount the impact of macroeconomic imbalance
in Taiwan, either. Such imbalance largely resulted from the combina-
tion of import substitution policy, adopted since the 1950s, and export
promotion policy, adopted since the 1960s. In order to analyze bilat-
eral trade issues properly, however, one should not lose sight of the
fact that there are vast structural reasons for the ROC's trade surplus
with the United States. Policymakers in both countries would do well
to attempt to narrow such differences, rather than attempt to eliminate
artificially such trade surplus.
The multilateral trade pattern of the ROC is a case in point. Ex-
cept for Japan, with which Taiwan suffers a huge trade deficit, Taiwan
enjoys a trade surplus with most of its leading trade partners, not only
the United States. Trade diversion by, for example, shifting import
items from Japanese products to American products becomes an obvi-
ous possibility for ROC trade policy.
Taiwan's overall trade surplus has been significantly padded by its
excess domestic savings. For example, in 1987, its savings rate set a
record by reaching almost forty percent of the total gross national
product [GNP].4° By contrast, its domestic investment rate has grad-
ually declined. For example, the 1987 gap between domestic savings
and domestic investment was a whopping twenty-one percent.41 This
gap is the primary culprit for Taiwan's trade surplus, including its
trade surplus with the United States. Another important structural
factor contributing to its trade surplus is Taiwan's high economic
38. See J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, BEYOND RECRIMINATION, supra note 6, at 17.
39. Id. at 155.
40. Wu, An Overview of the Economy of Taiwan 9-10 (paper presented at the third Joint
Meeting of Canada-Taiwan (ROC) Business Association, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada (Apr. 10,
1989)). The savings rate had started from less than ten percent in the 1950s to about twenty
percent in the mid-1960s. It exceeded thirty percent in 1972 and since then has comfortably
settled at a level over thirty percent, except in 1975.
41. Id. at 10.
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growth, reflected in its higher output rates and productivity, relative to
the United States. Taiwan's economy grew at an average annual rate
of 9.1 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1988, much higher than
the U.S. economic growth rate for the same period.
42
The unique demography of Taiwan's exporters and the current
year surplus enjoyed by the United States with respect to services sug-
gest a different treatment for Taiwan-U.S. trade relations. Unlike
Japan or Korea, Taiwan's economy is represented by small and me-
dium-size companies. Therefore, Taiwan's firms have not been able to
capture the added value from marketing their own goods. Rather,
U.S. retailers, multinational corporations with manufacturing subsidi-
aries, and Japanese trading conglomerates control the bulk of such
marketing networks.43 Significantly, exports to the U.S. by American-
invested companies have represented a substantial share of total Tai-
wan exports to the U.S. and the bilateral trade imbalance." While the
United States suffers a deficit in merchandise trade with Taiwan, the
United States appears to be more competitive than the ROC in service
trade. The possible contribution of American service trade to the nar-
rowing of bilateral trade imbalance has been acknowledged by the
ROC.45 In fact, as a result of opening its services market in recent
years, there already has been a significant growth of the service sector
of Taiwan's economy.
46
III. SECTORAL RETROSPECT OF MAJOR TRADE ISSUES
IN THE 1980s
This part examines, on a sectoral basis, the more important bilat-
eral trade issues resolved by the United States and Taiwan over the
past decade. Without making a thorough case study of each issue, one
nevertheless should be able to distill from these trade consultations the
42. Id. at 6.
43. See Sease, Taiwan's Export Boom to U. S. Owes Much to American Firms, Wall St. J.,
May 27, 1987, at 16.
44. According to BOFT statistics, the average percentage of exports to the U.S. by Ameri-
can-invested companies from 1981 through 1987 was 8.9%, and the average percentage of trade
imbalance caused by such exports for the same period was 15.7%. The trend in recent years also
suggests increasing exports by these companies, both in terms of absolute amount and percent-
age. See Com. Times, Aug. 14, 1989.
45. Chen, Salient Features of Amendment to the Insurance Law and Its Significance, in
STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES FOR THE INSURANCE LAW 9 (V. Sze ed. 1989)
(Remarks of a former Director General of the MOF's Division of Monetary Affairs [hereinafter
INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES].
46. In 1988, Taiwan's service sector grew by 9.8%, far exceeding the 4.6% rate registered for
growth in the industrial sector. The service sector represented 48.5% of Taiwan's GNP for 1988,
2.1% higher than the manufacturing sector. See Remarks by Lai, Finance Vice Minister, Com.
Times, Nov. 6, 1989, at 2.
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general American approach in initiating trade proposals to the ROC,
the ROC's approach in meeting American demands, and the overall
impact of such a trade adjustment process on Taiwan's economic liber-
alization. Trade consultations here are not limited to formal negotia-
tions, but include as well informal discussions that led to trade
concessions.
A. Agricultural Products
While the ROC has continued to reduce its tariffs and open its
market, agricultural imports have not been liberalized to the same ex-
tent as other aspects of bilateral trade relations. Obviously, political
sentiments and resistance from farmers in Taiwan are formidable hur-
dles and protecting the farmers has been a phenomenon in global
trade. Allowing the importation of certain American agricultural im-
ports (including turkey innards) aroused the anger of ROC farmers,
who waged a violent demonstration in Taipei on May 20, 1988. On
the whole, however, Taiwan has had a respectable record in respond-
ing to American initiatives in the agricultural sector. For example,
Taiwan is the largest consumer on a per capita basis of U.S. apples and
grapefruits, and American imports have overwhelming shares of the
import and retail markets.47 In 1988, U.S. corn represented 98% (or
U.S. $540 million) of the total corn imported into Taiwan, a conscious
attempt by the ROC to offset part of the trade imbalance through
grain imports from the United States. 48
The solution to the agricultural trade issue is more complicated
than simply importing more U.S. farm products. Importation of some
agricultural products may reduce the import volume of other Ameri-
can agricultural products. For example, imported U.S. corn has been
used to feed livestock in Taiwan. According to one ROC estimate,
completely opening the poultry market in Taiwan will reduce the U.S.
corn exports to Taiwan by 1.22 million tons a year and soy bean ex-
ports to Taiwan by 410,000 tons a year, totaling U.S. $270 million
each year.
49
B. Aviation
The AIT and CCNAA entered into an Air Transport Agreement
47. See Remarks by Kiang, Econ. Daily News, May 4, 1989, (Remarks of then Director
General of the BOFT, during trade consultations). In 1988, U.S. apple and grapefruit imports
constituted 87% and 100% of total imports and 71% and 79% of the retail market. Id.
48. Id. The tariff for corn was only 3% in 1988.
49. Id.
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on March 5, 1980.50 The agreement was based on principles of reci-
procity, non-discrimination, and fair competition. In September,
1987, United Air Lines sought to perform its own ground services
(that is, self-handling) under Article 7 of the Agreement and terminate
its ground handling contract with a government-owned service com-
pany. A dispute arose over the existence of any physical constraints or
safety concerns at the Chiang Kai-Shek Airport, which under the
agreement would justify a denial of the self-handling application. The
issue attracted wide publicity, as it surfaced in the midst of a BTN on
other trade issues, and was almost placed on the agenda. China Air
Lines, the ROC national carrier, would have been retaliated against
had the approval been denied. The case ended with informal discus-
sions leading to the approval of the application.5"
C. Banking and Related Financial Services
Traditionally conservative fiscal policies of the ROC government
necessarily created an intensively regulated banking industry. In fact,
various levels of the ROC government collectively own most of the
commercial banks in Taiwan. Foreign banks, including U.S. banks,
are subject to the review of the Ministry of Finance [MOF] and the
Central Bank of China [CBC] in terms of initial establishment and
business scope. 52 Over the years, however, requirements of the Regu-
lations Governing the Establishment of Branches and Representative
Offices by Foreign Banks [Foreign Banks Regulations] have been grad-
ually relaxed.
The securities business is an exception to this gradual relaxation.
Many ROC commercial banks have set up independent savings and
trust departments to engage in the securities business. Foreign banks,
which have been treated as commercial banks, have not been allowed
to set up such departments. In fact, foreign banks can only set up
another branch, which must be located in Kaohsiung, if certain per-
formance tests are met.
53
Foreign banks' ROC branches are also subject to certain lending
and operating requirements. For example, their N.T.$-denominated
deposits may not exceed 12.5 times of the branch's registered operat-
50. Air Transport Agreement between the AIT and the CCNAA, Mar. 5, 1980, 1 CHINESE
Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 210 (1981).
51. American Institute in Taiwan, U.S. Airlines Ground Services, BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 30,
1988, at 3.
52. Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at n.341.
53. Guidelines Governing the Establishment of Branches or Agencies by Foreign Banks,
arts. 8, 9.
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ing capital in Taiwan. Where necessary, the MOF may, in consulta-
tion with the CBC, adopt proper restrictions on lending by such
branches .5
4
As for related financial services, BTNs on the banking sector have
led to permission for foreign banks to join the United Debit Card
Center for the issuance of debit cards. As a result of trade talks in
August 1988, the ROC has decided to change N.T.$-denominated
debit cards into credit cards and change the center into a Credit Card
Center. American companies wishing to issue such cards must oper-
ate through this center.
55
On July 17, 1989, a major amendment to the Banking Law was
enacted. For the first time privately held commercial banks will be
permitted to be set up in Taiwan. Pursuant to the amendment, foreign
banks' ROC branches will be granted the powers to engage in savings
and trust business.56 As the detailed regulations for setting up new
commercial banks have ye to be finalized, the MOF is not expected to
amend the Foreign Banks Regulations until early 1990. Nonetheless,
the amendment made clear that treatment of foreign banks' ROC
branches will approximate complete national treatment. This is not a
modest gesture; ROC nationals have not been able to own banks while
about three dozen foreign banks already maintain branches in Taiwan.
In fact, even before the passage of the Bank Law amendment, there
had been public criticism that granting national treatment to foreign
banks would discriminate against ROC nationals.
57
Foreign banks, presumably, will be interested in further develop-
ment of the ROC banking market after regulations for the establish-
ment of new commercial banks are finalized. As the banking sector is
considered to be more important than the securities market, one sus-
pects that foreign banks will not be permitted to set up or acquire
ROC banks immediately; joint venture opportunities will not be avail-
able until the MOF has had the opportunity to review the effects of
setting up new commercial banks. 58 Further liberalization of the
banking sector along these lines apparently will be based on reciproc-
ity and other countries' trade initiatives.
54. Id. art. 15. There are still some restrictions on such lending. See H. KAO, FOREIGN
EXCHANGE BUSINESS: REGULATIONS AND OPERATIONS 72 (4th ed. 1987); FOREIGN Ex-
CHANGE BUSINESS: REGULATIONS AND OPERATIONS 122 (5th ed. 1989).
55. Guidelines Governing the Business of United Credit Cards Operated by Banks (amended
Sept. 8, 1988).
56. Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at text accompanying note 323.
57. Ying, Liberalization of the Financial Market and Integration of Regulations, in MONE-
TARY MARKET POLICY, pt. A (Library of the Legislative Yuan ed. 1989).
58. See Econ. Daily News, Nov. 12, 1989, at 2.
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Despite certain lending restrictions applicable to them, foreign
banks enjoy the exclusive privilege of pre-sale foreign exchange export
loans. ROC banks may not engage in such business. Therefore, for-
eign banks are entitled to certain favorable treatment on an exclusive
basis, above and beyond the national treatment requirement.5 9 Simi-
larly, foreign ownership in financial leasing companies, a business still
not open to ROC nationals on a general basis, may now reach ninety
percent.
60
D. Beer, Wine and Tobacco
One of the most controversial and emotional chapters in the
BTN's - the importation, distribution, and sale of beer, wine, and
tobacco - became a thorny trade issue in 1985. All such distribu-
tions and sales could only be made by or through the Taiwan Tobacco
and Wine Monopoly Bureau [TTWMB] of the Provincial Government
of Taiwan, a system remaining from the days of Japanese occupation
of Taiwan between 1896 and 1945.61 In a rush action to respond to
U.S. pressures, the ROC entered into a short-term agreement in Octo-
ber, 1985 to open up the monopolized market. 62 Negotiations for the
detailed implementation of this market, however, broke down in mid-
1986. The U.S. then made a determination in October, 1986 under
section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act to seek retaliation. Taiwan had to
grudgingly comply with American demands and U.S. investigations
for retaliatory measures were terminated. 63 A definitive agreement
was entered into between the CCNAA and the AIT on December 12,
1986, providing for detailed implementation guidelines for market-
opening measures by the TTWMB. The agreement pertained to ac-
ceptable importation procedures, monopoly taxes, pricing of products,
warehousing and distribution arrangements, acceptable limits in ad-
vertising and promotional activities, labeling and packaging require-
ments, and penalties for noncompliance with TTWMB's guidelines. 64
59. See CBC, Foreign Exchange Bureau Circular Letter (Aug. 24, 1983) (Ref. No. 72-Tai-
Yiang-Wuai-4-20538); H. KAO, supra note 54, at 152.
60. Guidelines on Handling Applications to Establish Leasing Companies by Foreign Leas-
ing Companies, art. I.
61. In addition, the Monopoly Bureau's existence has been officially recognized by special
legislation granting such monopolies in 1953.
62. Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,639 (1986).
This agreement committed Taiwan to remove the prohibition on beer imports and permit the sale
of U. S. wines, cigarettes, and beer at the same outlets for Taiwan products. It also obligated the
ROC to permit price mark-ups on American products at a level not greater than that for Taiwan
products. In general, the American demand sought more room for market forces. Id.
63. Id.
64. For a full text, see 6 CHINESE Y.B INT'L L. & AFF. 440-45 (1986-87).
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From an international perspective, conflict in the trade of beer,
wine, and tobacco carries multilateral trade implications. The ROC
has been adhering to the GATT principle of non-discrimination with
its trading partners wherever possible. In addition, the European to-
bacco companies with their lobbyists in the EEC Commission could
cause the EEC to pressure Taiwan to grant European companies the
same concessions given to American companies. Failure to open the
beer, wine, and tobacco market to the EEC, for example, could lead to
curtailment of Taiwan's quotas for textile exports to the EEC. On
January 1, 1987, the ROC opened up this market to most of its non-
American trading partners, giving them a free ride on U.S.-Taiwan
trade consultations.
E. Color Television Exports
Electronics became one of the leading export items from Taiwan in
the late 1970s. The ROC now has come to enjoy substantial competi-
tive advantages in the production of color television sets. On Decem-
ber 3, 1980, the AIT and the CCNAA entered into an agreement to
extend the previously agreed upon self-restraint measures.
65
F. Currency Appreciation and Foreign Exchange Control
The ROC has had foreign exchange controlled since the late
1940s. 66 Shortage of foreign exchange has been a great concern to its
policy makers since the beginning of the economic surge in the 1950s.
The continuing current-account trade surplus and excess savings in
the ROC's financial system in recent years have resulted in the ac-
cumulation of foreign exchange reserves to the order of U.S. $74 bil-
lion, suggestive of an infatuation with bullionism. 67 The foreign
exchange reserves and trade surpluses are easy targets in any BTN.
Analysis also has shown that the N.T. dollar had been undervalued
between 1981 and 1986.68 As a result of informal trade discussions,
the N.T. dollar has been allowed to appreciate nominally more than
65. Memorandum Concerning Extension of Self-restraint Measures for Exporting Color Tele-
vision Receivers to the United States (Dec. 3, 1980), 1 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 240 (1981).
66. See Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at text accompanying n.9.
67. See Translation of U, S. Treasury Report on Taiwan's Currency Conversion Rate, Com.
Times, Oct. 29, 1989, at 3. The amount of Taiwan's foreign exchange reserves is the second
largest in the world and represents 19 months of merchandise imports. Id. Another statistic
suggests that such reserves had been reduced to U.S. $72.8 billion by October 18, 1989. See
Com. Times, Oct. 19, 1989, at 1.
68. See Chu, Taiwan's Trade Surplus, U.S. Responses and Adjustment Policies, in ROC-U.S.
RELATIONS UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS 80, 84 (K.
Chang ed. 1988).
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57.5% against the U.S. dollar since 1985.69 Unlike other sectoral
trade adjustments, currency appreciation has affected virtually the en-
tire economy as Taiwan has become greatly dependent on interna-
tional trade. With the currency appreciation, less competitive
businesses had to either fold or relocate their manufacturing opera-
tions overseas.
From an institutional perspective, currency appreciation precipi-
tated the liberalization of foreign exchange controls. To that end, the
Statute for the Administration of Foreign Exchange was amended in
June 1987.70 To forestall further appreciation and the influx of short-
term, speculative "hot monies," limits on inward remittance were er-
ected, whereas virtually all limits on outward remittance were re-
moved. 7' Soon after an informal consultation between officials of the
two countries in early 1989, Taiwan implemented a major modifica-
tion in the trading system of the Taipei Foreign Exchange Trading
Center. As a result, N.T. dollar trading and fluctuation now are prac-
tically driven by market forces. 72 Although expressing inclinations to
see narrowing trade surpluses, U.S. Treasury officials stated in their
October 27, 1989 report to the Congress that they saw no clear indica-
tion of currency manipulation by the ROC.73 The report also ac-
knowledged that the first eight months' trade volume showed a 14.5
percent reduction in the trade imbalance.
74
Taiwan's economic development began when it was suffering from
a shortage of foreign exchange. That is no longer the case, as indi-
cated by the amendment to the Statute for the Administration of For-
eign Exchange to liberalize foreign exchange controls. As a result, its
laws and regulations governing foreign investment in the ROC and
overseas investment by individuals and companies, which have always
used foreign exchange repatriation rights as a primary incentive, have
been substantially amended.
75
69. See Econ. Daily News, Oct. 29, 1989, at 2. Trade talks on currency appreciation have
been extremely sensitive and secretive so as to avoid market speculation expectations beforehand.
70. See Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at text accompanying n.56.
71. Id. at text accompanying nn.81, 85. Inward remittance limit was first set at U.S. $50,000
per person per year, and has been increased to U.S. $500,000 per person per year. Outward
remittance limit is U.S. $5 million per person per year.
72. See Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at text accompanying n. 120.
73. See Translation of U. S. Treasury Report on Taiwan's Currency Conversion Rate, supra
note 67.
74. The report also indicated that, if Taiwan's U.S. $2.5 billion of gold imports from the U.S.
in 1988 were included as the basis for comparison, then the trade imbalance actually worsened by
13%. Id.
75. They include amendments to the Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals and Regu-
lations Governing the Review of Outward Investment and Outward Technical Cooperation. See
Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at text accompanying nn.90-116.
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G. Customs Valuation
The 1978 and 1979 trade agreements discussed above essentially
obligated the ROC to adhere to certain rules governing customs valua-
tion resulting from the Tokyo Round MTN. 76 The GATT customs
valuation code requires the use of transaction values, but, for conven-
ience in administration and assurance of customs revenue collection,
the ROC continued to use its tables for duty paying values in assessing
ad valorem customs duties. As a result, the United States made a find-
ing of violations of trade agreements and the USTR was directed to
seek retaliations under section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act in August
1986.
77
The issue was quickly disposed of when the ROC agreed to cease
the challenged practice by October 1, 1986. The U.S. subsequently
terminated its investigations for retaliatory measures. 78 On June 29,
1986, the ROC promulgated an amendment to its Customs Law to
provide for true transaction values as the basis for customs valuation
and eliminated any customs duty uplift.
7 9
H. Export Performance Requirement
As part of the ROC's Automobile Industrial Development Plan to
develop further an automobile industry, foreign investors in the auto-
mobile industry were required, as an administrative matter, to meet
certain export performance standards. The case in point was the
ROC's approval of Toyota's investment application to set up a manu-
facturing subsidiary in Taiwan. The investment approval was granted
on the condition that the production would gradually increase from
12.5% at the beginning to fifty percent by 1992. The USTR com-
menced an investigation in April, 1986 under section 307 of the 1974
Trade Act.80 Trade consultations were soon held, and the ROC
agreed to forsake such a requirement for pending and future applica-
tions. It also agreed to overhaul its Automotive Industrial Develop-
ment Plan by June, 1987 and to discontinue the Plan's export
performance requirements retroactively. In return, the USTR closed
the case.8t
76. See supra nn. 20, 22.
77. See Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,219
(1986).
78. See Taiwan Customs Valuation Unfair Practice, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,528 (1986).
79. See Exchange of letters between Representative Konsin C. Shah and Chairman David
Dean of the AIT (Oct. 24, 1979), supra note 22.
80. See Initiation of Investigation under Section 307: Taiwan Export Performance Require-
ments in the Automotive Sector, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,008 (1986).
81. See Termination of Investigation: Export Performance Requirements in the Automotive
Winter 19901
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I. Fishery Dispute
On August 24, 1989, the AIT and the CCNAA entered into a de-
finitive Northern Pacific fishery agreement. 82 The agreement avoided
U.S. retaliatory measures such as restricting the U.S. $400 million's
worth of annual fishery imports from Taiwan. The trade issue came
about as a result of some Taiwan fishing boats catching salmon in total
disregard of international fishery conventions. Significantly, the agree-
ment granted U.S. coastal authorities parajudicial privileges such as
visitation and inspection rights aboard ROC fishing vessels on. the high
seas, subject to prior notice and subsequent transfer of any incident of
violation to the ROC authorities. 83 These privileges generated heated
debates in the press and among legislators. ROC negotiators also be-
latedly sought to add a third-party arbitration provision to the agree-
ment, but failed to obtain it. Nevertheless, the national interest was
thought served by having an agreement to reduce tensions in bilateral
trade relations with the U.S.84
J. Insurance
Taiwan's insurance market is still relatively untapped, and insur-
ance was identified as one of the key American trade interests as early
as the 1979 bilateral trade agreement. The MOF, therefore, adopted
Measures for Screening and Approving the Establishment of Branches
by United States Insurance Companies within the ROC in 1985 to
implement the results of trade consultations since 1979.85 As
amended in April; 1986 and October, 1987, the Measures provide for
certain eligibility requirements to be met by American insurance com-
panies.86 The ROC was able to set a quota in the Measures regarding
the number of American insurance applicants; currently each year at
most two American life and two non-life insurance companies will be
Sector on Taiwan, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,558 (1986); see also Exchange of Letters between Representa-
tive Frederick F. Chien of the CCNAA and Chairman David Dean of the AIT (Oct. 9, 1986),
reprinted in 6 CHINESE Y.B. OF INT'L L. & AFF. 413 (1986-87).
82. See Econ. Daily News, Aug. 26, 1989. The agreement had been initialed on June 30,
1989. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Liu, A Calm Assessment of the U.S.-ROC Fishery Negotiations, China Times, July 2,
1989.
85. See Liu, Survey of Major Commercial Law Developments in the Republic of China: 1987-
1988, 7 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 136, 153 (1987-88).
86. Id. Essentially, they must have at least N.T. $500 million (about U.S. $20 million) of
paid-in capital, ten years of track record, a favorable business result equal to "class A" given by
rating agencies for the year before the application, a clean record of not having been subject to
regulatory sanctions in the U. S. for five years before the application, and experience in interna-
tional insurance business.
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licensed.8 7 There are now twenty-three domestic insurance companies
(including fourteen property insurance companies, eight life insurance
companies and one reinsurance company) and twelve American insur-
ance companies (six of them are life insurance companies and the
other six are non-life insurance companies).8 8
The investment powers of these branches have been expanded re-
cently. They now may invest in the listed stocks and bonds of ROC
manufacturing companies for up to thirty-five percent of their funds
and liability reserves. 89 Because of limited space in Taiwan, American
insurance companies' Taiwan branches have not been accorded full
national treatment as far as real estate investment is concerned. 90 But
the Insurance Law will be amended in part to accommodate U.S.
trade initiatives, such as creating mutual insurance companies as a
new legal form of insurance company.91
K. Intellectual Property Rights
The protection of intellectual property rights has always been one
of the most important bilateral trade issues. 92 Not merely limited to
BTNs by the executive branch, it has also involved coordination with
the legislative and judicial branches of the ROC on the enactment,
amendment, and enforcement of relevant laws. The 1988 Trade Act
has placed even greater focus on the protection of intellectual property
rights by foreign countries. As a result, strenuous efforts have been
made to ensure American satisfaction. For example, the Executive
87. Id.
88. See Sze, Analysis of a Bill of the Ministry of Finance to Amend theYnsurance Law, in SZE,
INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 45, at 139.
89. Regulations Governing the Investment in Securities by Overseas Chinese and Foreign
Nationals and Remittance, art. 2.
90. See Chen, Salient Features of Amendment to the Insurance Law and Its Significance, in
INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 45, at 13. The former Director General of the
MOF's Division of Monetary Affairs stated that during trade talks in Washington, D. C., the
ROC expressed the view that such real estate investment powers should not be granted as Tai-
wan is only one-twentieth the size of Texas. Id.
91. Id. For a criticism, see Sze, Analysis of A Bill of the Ministry of Finance to Amend the
Insurance Law, in INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 45, at 140. For a general
comparison of the ROC insurance law and American insurance law, see Kimball, Insurance Law
in the United States and the ROC: A Brief Comparative Analysis in INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE
PRINCIPLES, supra note 45, at 21.
92. For a general discussion on the ROC's efforts to protect intellectual property rights, see
Lin, Protection of Intellectual Property in the Republic of China, 6 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. &
AFF. 120 (1986-87); Silk, Legal Efforts of the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan
at Controlling the Transnational Flow of Commercial Counterfeit Goods, 5 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L
L. & AFF. 90 (1985); Han, Protection from Commercial Counterfeiters in Taiwan for U. S. Firms,
16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 642 (1984); Hickman, Protecting Intellectual Property in Taiwan-
Non-Recognized United States Corporations and Their Treaty Right ofAccess to Courts, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 117 (1984).
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Yuan announced an important policy statement on the protection of
intellectual property rights on August 31, 1989.93 Within the cabinet's
Sino-American Trade Task Force, a policy coordination subgroup has
been set up. The BOFT has requested the Ministry of Legal Affairs,
the Ministry of Interior [MOI], and the Government Information Of-
fice to provide statistics on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights by the fifteenth of each month in order to forward them to the
United States. 94 Enforcement staff at the MOI and the BOFT will be
expanded, as will the National Anticounterfeiting Committee. Start-
ing from 1990, textbooks for elementary schools and junior high
schools will contain lessons intended to emphasize the importance of
the protection of intellectual property rights.95 In a circular letter
dated August 1, 1989, the Judicial Yuan of the ROC requested that
various courts review the seriousness of violations in infringement
cases so that the punishment will provide adequate disincentives, that
special tribunals be established or judges be assigned for infingement
cases, and that judges follow deadlines for speedy trials.
96
1. Copyright Protection
Copyright issues involve the publishing business, computer compa-
nies, motion pictures, and Taiwan's need to obtain new information
through translating foreign work. Indeed, the stakes are high.97 As
the result of a series of BTN's, the ROC completely rewrote its Copy-
right Law in 1985. The 1985 law remedied many of the problems
under the prior law. For example, computer programs were made spe-
cifically subject to copyright.98 A foreign person or company holding
an ROC copyright could bring a private criminal prosecution in ROC
courts even though it has not been recognized to do business in Tai-
93. See Econ. Daily News, Sept. 25, 1989.
94. Id. For example, from January, 1989 to August, 1989, a total of 2270 cases were subject
to police investigations for criminal prosecution, including 28 cases involving American owners
of intellectual property rights, 76 cases involving European owners, 16 cases involving Japanese
owners, and 2149 cases involving ROC owners. Of them, 2268 cases were prosecuted, including
16 cases involving American owners, 76 cases involving European owners and 16 cases involving
Japanese owners. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. For example, during the first eight months of 1989, the Government Information Office,
the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the Taipei and Kaohsiung City Governments conducted
investigations on MTV parlours on 4,197 occasions, on videotape leasing outlets on 1,143 occa-
sions, and on other premises on forty-nine occasions. 36,156 videotapes copying Taiwanese-
made films, 4148 videotapes copying Western-made films and 23,475 videotapes copying Japa-
nese films were seized. Id.
98. Copyright Law, art. 4(l)(xiv).
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wan. 99 Foreign authors could seek ROC copyright registration based
on first publication in Taiwan or reciprocity. As a result of pre-emp-
tion under the FCN treaty, American authors are not even subject to
this requirement.' °° The 1985 Copyright Law also provides for the
seizure of infringing products and has increased penalties for violation
up to a minimum prison term of three years.' 0 ' It allows damages to
be assessed on the basis of both loss of profits to copyright owners and
illegal gains to infringers, and provides for minimum damages at 500
times the retail value of the infringed articles.'
0 2
Continuing trade consultations also led to the initialing of an
agreement on July 14, 1989 by the AIT and the CCNAA on the pro-
tection of intellectual property rights. The agreement will include
translation and similarly derivative works and the term of protection
will be fifty years. There also will be retroactive protection (excepting
trarlslation rights) for works completed since 1965. Translation rights,
which have not been protected as a result of an exception to the FCN
Treaty, but which have been a controversial issue, nevertheless will be
granted but made subject to compulsory licensing. The ROC also
agreed to add the definition of "public" displays in a bill to amend the
1985 Copyrighf Law. The agreement is expected to be signed after the
bill is enacted.
t0 3
On August 24, 1989, the ROC's Executive Yuan approved a bill to
amend the 1985 Copyright Law to expand the definition of "public"
display or performance and broaden the definition of infringement to
include duplications such as public displays, performances or screen-
ings. As a result of an ultimatum from the USTR in late October,
1989, the ROC agreed to revise the bill so that infringement could be
found regardless of whether the infringer seeks profit from such dupli-
cation. In response, the USTR removed Taiwan from the priority
watch list in its November 1, 1989 report required by "Special 301" of
the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Instead, Taiwan was placed on the gen-
eral review watch list.104
99. Id art. 17.
100. See Letter of Ministry of Interior (Jan. 31, 1986) (Ref. No. 75-Tai-Nay-Chu-368451);
Letter of Ministry of Legal Affairs (Feb. 5, 1986) (Ref. No. Fa-75-Chien-1375); Letter of the
Judicial Yuan (Feb. 25, 1989) (Ref. No.75-Yuan-Tai-Ting-l-01986).
101. Copyright Law, art. 38.
102. Id. art. 33.
103. See Agreement for the Protection of Copyright between the American Institute in Tai-
wan and the Coordination Council for Northern American Affairs, art. 19.
104. See From Intensive Care Unit to the General Ward, China Times (Chung Kuo Shih
Pao), Nov. 2, 1989, at 10. The ROC will continue to negotiate on the "fair use" doctrine. Id.
Placement on the priority watch list would have required improvement in three months to avoid
retaliatory measures.
Winter 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
A further amendment to the Copyright Law is expected to be sub-
mitted in 1990 to the Legislative Yuan to expand the definition of edi-
torial work (to include, for example, editing encyclopedias), remove
the limitation on foreign authors' Chinese translation rights (but sub-
ject to compulsory licensing), relax the definition of "first publication
in the ROC," extend protection to both foreign authors and foreign
copyright holders, expand the doctrine of fair use, and remove the re-
striction that foreign works of authorship have to be registered in Tai-
wan in order to be copyrighted.
2. Patent Protection
The Patent Law was substantially amended on December 24, 1986,
and incorporated many proposals brought out in BTNs on patent pro-
tection. 105 Responding to American concerns, product patents on
chemicals and pharmaceuticals and their use may now be granted;
under the prior law only the manufacturing process could be pat-
ented.' 0 6 The amendment also provided for three alternative tests to
determine damages for patent infringement: the traditional approach
based on loss of profits and cost incurred, the restitution approach
treating illegal gains as loss of profits, or awards assessed by the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards. 0 7 Significantly, the burden of proof in
infringement cases involving process patents has been reversed.1l 8
Foreign patentees have also been granted access to ROC courts, even
though they have not been recognized to do business in Taiwan. 10 9
The amendment also authorized the establishment of special patent
tribunals. 110
While the 1986 Patent Law has been largely satisfactory, there are
ongoing discussions to enhance certain aspects of the law.I' They
relate primarily to those provisions in the 1986 law that restrict pat-
entability or the exercise of patent rights. 1 2 It has been recommended
that the reversal of burden of proof, for example, be expanded to in-
105. See Liu & Chiang, The Amended Patent Law of the Republic of China, 6 CHINESE Y.B.
INT'L L. & AFF. 260 (1986-87); see also AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ROC, THE CASE
FOR PATENTABILITY OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept.
1985); PATENTABILITY OF AGRICHEMICALS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 1985).
106. Patent Law, art. 4.
107. Id. art. 82.
108. Id. art. 85-1.
109. Id. art. 88-1.
110. Id. art. 88-2.
111. See Liu & Chiang, supra, note 105 at 266.
112. AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE ROC, SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RE-
VISION OF THE ROC PATENT LAW (Apr. 1988).
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clude cases involving infringement by imported articles. It has also
been suggested that article 68-1, added in 1986 to require compulsory
licensing for failure to practice a patent, be relaxed so that importation
and sale of patented products in an amount sufficient to meet the
ROC's need will constitute proper working of the patent. Other sug-
gestions have included extension of the term for pharmaceutical pat-
ents, deletion of the compulsory licensing requirement in article 42
relating to process patents, deletion of article 67 relating to the revoca-
tion of a patent for failure to practice it, and extending patent protec-
tion to microorganisms." 3
3. Trademark Protection
Trademark protection was one of the trade issues identified early
in the 1978 and 1979 trade agreements.' 14 As a result of further trade
discussions, the Trademark Law was amended in 1983 and 1985. Ad-
ded in 1983, article 62-1 extended trademark protection to unregis-
tered but "world famous" foreign trademarks. This is a major
breakthrough, as trademark protection in the ROC generally rests on
registration, which is based on a first-come, first-registered principle.
In addition, article 62-3 provides for seizure of infringing goods and
article 62 provides for a five-year maximum prison term.
In the same spirit, the 1985 amendment revised Article 66 to grant
all foreign owners of ROC-registered trademarks access to bring civil
actions and criminal prosecutions in ROC courts, even though they
have not been recognized to do business in Taiwan. Significantly,
article 64 was also amended to provide for statutory damages between
500 to 1,500 times the value of the infringed products, substantially
reducing the burden of proof for trademark owners. Indeed, hefty
damages in the order of millions of dollars have been awarded, a nota-
ble phenomenon in a civil law jurisdiction where judges are conserva-
tive in such assessments.115 Following a further amendment in May,
1989, foreign trademark owners who first used a trademark which was
subsequently registered by others in Taiwan may now lodge an opposi-
tion action as interested parties on the grounds of the registrant's mis-
leading the public." 6 Circumstances authorizing the seizure of
infringing goods have also been expanded. 1 7
113. Id. at 1 et seq.
114. See text accompanying notes 20-24.
115. See BOARD OF FOREIGN TRADE, ROC's DETERMINATION To ERADICATE COUNTER-
FEITING AND CURRENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS 9 (July 1986). The award of N.T. $82,580,000 in
this case translates into more than U.S. $3 million.
116. Trademark Law, arts. 46, 52.
117. Id. arts. 62-63.
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One of the ROC's commitments in its 1979 trade agreement with
the United States was preventing the export of counterfeit goods from
Taiwan. In April, 1981, the BOFT issued the Regulations Governing
the Prevention of Trademark Counterfeiting and False Marking of
Place of Origin.' 18 Essentially, unless an exporter can demonstrate the
right to use a trademark in the country of destination with respect to
trademarked goods, he will not obtain the export permit for the expor-
tation of such goods. Amazingly, these regulations practically provide
for extraterritorial applicability of section 337 of the 1974 Trade
Act,' 19 with the BOFT instead of U.S. Customs being the enforcement
authority.
4. Fair Trade Law Draft
As a natural crossover from the protection of intellectual property
rights, unfair competition laws prohibiting trade libel, misappropria-
tion of and the passing off of trade secrets were discussed in BTNs
between 1985 and 1986. A Fair Trade Law draft was then adopted in
1986 for legislative debate. However, as an omnibus legislation that
will also provide for antitrust rules, the Fair Trade Law draft gener-
ated enough controversy to be bogged down in the ROC's Legislative
Yuan.120 Indeed, American pressures for its passage may backfire in-
sofar as U.S.-invested businesses in Taiwan will be subject to the anti-
trust rules in the Fair Trade Law draft.
L. Labor Affairs
The 1984 Trade Act specifically acknowledges foreign labor prac-
tices as a keen American trade interest, insofar as they affect the per-
ceived competitiveness of foreign goods in the U.S. market. The Act
ties the American evaluation of foreign workers' rights to the continu-
ation of the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] for imports
from a particular country. 12 1 On May 12, 1986, the AIT and the
CCNAA entered into a set of Guidelines for A Cooperative Program
in Labor Affairs. 122 Under the pretext of enhancing "commercial, cul-
tural and other relations," the Guidelines enabled the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, as a "consultant" to the AIT, and the Ministry of
118. See Silk, supra note 92, at 116.
119. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1974).
120. See Liu, ROC Fair Trade Law Analysis, supra note 7, at 5.
121. See § 501 of the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2461 note (Supp. 1986), collected in J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 398, 399 (2d ed. Documents Supp. 1989).
122. For a full text, see 6 CHINESE Y.B. OF INT'L L. & AFF. 410-12 (1987).
[Vol. 11:326
U.S.-Taiwan Trade
Interior (MOI), as an "affiliate" of the CCNAA, to increase contacts
and cooperation between the'two parties' labor personnel. 123 The
types of cooperative activities include exchange of information such as
publications, visits, seminars, workshops, and research. The initial ar-
eas of cooperation include topics such as vocational training, employ-
ment service, occupational safety and health, mine safety and health,
and labor statistics.
124
Compared to other topics of American trade interest, the AIT ap-
parently has been more tacit in voicing American concerns with the
labor practices in Taiwan. There may be several reasons for this cau-
tion. First, labor matters are the internal matters of another country.
Second, recent political developments in Taiwan have had much to do
with the emerging labor movement. Third, the ROC enacted a Basic
Labor Standards Law [BLSL] in 1984, which has been applied to the
manufacturing sector of the economy. The BLSL provides for sub-
stantive labor requirements such as compulsory retirement fund and
severance fund contributions, limitations on terminable-at-will em-
ployment contracts, occupational safety requirements, and wages. Ar-
guably, the corpus of labor legislation in the ROC is at times more
stringent than American labor laws because of substantive require-
ments such as those under the BLSL.'
25
M. Machine Tools
A voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) was entered into between
the AIT and the CCNAA on December 15, 1986, governing the ex-
port of machine tools, another example of a successful ROC industry
attracting protectionist sentiments in the United States. 126 The VRA
limited the market share of Taiwan's machine tool exports to the
United States under a licensing system until the end of 1991.127 Talks,
however, could begin pursuant to the agreement, which permitted re-
view after three years.
128
N. Rice Exports
Rice has been a staple on Chinese farms. In the transition from an
123. Id. at 410, 411.
124. Id. at 411, 412.
125. Rather, Taiwan's labor legislation is perhaps more analogous to Japanese labor laws.
For a U.S.-Japan comparison, see W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1984).
126. See Arrangement between the CCNAA and AIT Concerning Trade in Certain Machine
Tools, December 15, 1986, 6 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 445-60 (1987).
127. Id. at 446, 447.
128. See Com. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at 26.
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agrarian society to an industrialized economy, Taiwan found that its
rice production exceeded demand in the domestic market. In 1984,
the U.S. Rice Millers' Association lodged a complaint alleging subsi-
dized rice exports form Taiwan that led to BTNs. As a result, the
CCNAA and the AIT entered into an agreement to limit the quantity
and markets for Taiwan's rice exports through 1988.129 Under the
agreement, Taiwan could only export rice to countries with less than
U.S. $795 of per capita income.' 30 Ironically, the series of letters con-
stituting the agreement also contain a reaffirmation of Taiwan's "Buy
American" policy, including the purchase of U.S. grains.' 3 '
0. Securities
The ROC began to internationalize its securities market in 1983,
when the government adopted a three-stage plan.' 32 As a first step,
four mutual fund management companies were allowed to be set up as
international joint ventures. These companies included leading Amer-
ican banking and securities firms as their shareholders. 133 Each of the
companies has set up a much sought-after mutual fund for foreign in-
vestors to invest indirectly in listed stocks on the Taiwan Stock
Exchange. 134
When a major amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law
[SEL] was enacted in 1988, care was taken to ensure that foreign se-
curities firms could set up operations as partially-owned subsidiaries
or branches. American and other foreign securities firms have been
able to occupy a significant minority position in integrated securities
houses.135 In mid-1989, regulations were adopted to allow three
world-class securities firms to apply to set up a branch in Taiwan each
year to engage in the brokerage business; two of the three applicants
for 1989 are American securities firms.
136
The Banking Law amendment of 1989 will enable foreign banks to
set up trust departments. 37 As the trust departments of most ROC
129. See Memorandum of Understanding between the AIT and the CCNAA Concerning Ex-
ports of Rice from Taiwan, March 1, 1984, 4 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 334-40 (1984).
130. Id. at 335.
131. Id. at 340.
132. See Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7, at text accompanying note 160.
133. Id. at n.163.
134. Id. at n.164. Subsequent steps were postponed as a result of bulging foreign exchange
reserves and the inflationary pressure that will result from allowing more passive investment
funds to come into Taiwan. Id. at text accompanying note 161.
135. Id. at text following note 232.
136. Id. at text followingdnote 242.
137. See Liu, Financial Reform in the ROC, supra note 7.
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commercial banks have been licensed as securities firms under the
SEL, foreign banks may also set up trust departments, through which
they may then seek licensing as securities firms.'
38
P. Shipping and Transportation
A series of technical talks between the CCNAA and the AIT on
shipping issues were held in November, 1986, April, 1987, and Sep-
tember, 1989. As a result of the April, 1987 meetings, U.S. carriers
now may have their branch offices licensed to do business as container
terminal operators or as sea cargo forwarders and U.S. shipping may
be licensed to conduct similar business in Taiwan as well. 139 The AIT
also expressed concern with matters such as the reasonableness of the
rental payments for harbor space leases and the permission for U.S.
carriers to own and operate trucking services for land transportation
of containers as part of the intermodal movement of cargo. Although
the ROC's National Highway Law prohibited such foreign trucking
services, the CCNAA agreed to consider a legislative amendment au-
thorizing such foreign services, provided that certain conditions based
upon the ROC's police powers were met. t4°
In the BTNs, the CCNAA also voiced concerns about various
matters, including the perception of the U.S. Federal Maritime Com-
mission's investigation of the ROC's national carriers as retaliatory,
and the difficulty faced by ROC carriers' employees in securing visas
from the Immigration and Naturalization Services.
t41
Q. Tariff Reductions
Tariff reductions have been a major item of discussion in every
BTN. Since 1971, the ROC has revised its tariff schedules almost
twenty times to reduce tariffs, whether as a result of BTNs with the
United States or unilateral concessions.142 In all cases, one policy goal
has always been to cut tariffs on those items which will make U.S.
goods more competitive. The average effective duty rate was reduced
138. The Foreign Banks Regulations will have to be amended first. See text following note
56.
139. Text of Agreements Concluded between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coor-
dination Council for North American Affairs in 1987-1988, 7 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 425
(1987-88).
140. Id. at 427. They include the application of expropriation and other measures in cases of
national emergencies, security inspection, taxation, tariff regulation, and other requirements ap-
plicable to domestic operators.
141. Id. at 431.
142. See TRADE RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 6.
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from 14.4 percent in 1971 to 6.9 percent in 1987.14 By early 1989, it
had been reduced to 5.66 percent, not much higher than the prevailing
rate in other industrialized countries. 144 The ROC has adopted a plan
to further reduce tariffs so that by 1992, the average effective rate will
have been reduced to 3.5 percent.
145
R. Technology Transfer
The urge to diversify its exports and explore new frontiers in trade
have led Taiwan to newer markets. For example, Taiwan is now seek-
ing to expand its new trade frontiers to include the Eastern Bloc and
certain other socialist countries. Technology exports from Taiwan,
therefore, have become an American trade and strategic concern.
146
Recent trade consultations between the AIT and the CCNAA con-
cluded that formal BTNs on the control of Taiwan's export of technol-
ogy and technological products will commence by May, 1990.147 The
U.S. claimed that an agreement on such control will make American
technology, and even technology from member countries of the Coor-
dinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM), more accessible
to Taiwan's companies.148 Still the ROC is rightfully concerned that
such strategic controls do not become trade barriers; technological
products have become the most important exported items from Tai-
wan, which now needs to penetrate new markets to diversify its
exports. 1
49
It is expected that a control agreement will be concluded, and that
the ROC position will seek to minimize the agreement's adverse effect
upon its technology industry. In fact, the proposed Trade Law draft
already contains a provision authorizing the BOFT to regulate the ex-
port of technology and technological products. 50 However, public
opinion in Taiwan remains negative because of the perception that the
agreement will result in net disadvantages to Taiwan.' 51
143. Between 1985 and 1987, tariffs on 4,727 items were cut and in February 1988, tariffs on
3,523 items were slashed again. Id.
144. Id. at 7.
145. COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, DETAILED ACTION PLAN
FOR STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC AND TRADE TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES 12 (Mar. 1989)
[hereinafter ACTION PLAN].
146. See Com. Times, Nov. 10, 1989, at 2.
147. See Econ. Daily News, Nov. 11, 1989, at 2.
148. See Com. Times, Nov. 10, 1989, at 2.
149. See Econ. Daily News, Nov. 10, 1989, at 2; Econ. Daily News, Nov. 11, 1989, at 2.
150. See Draft Trade Law, art. 27; see also Econ. Daily News, Nov. 24, 1989, at 7.
151. See Com. Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at 1, 3.
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S. Textiles
Textiles have been one of Taiwan's leading export items. There-
fore, it is not surprising that textiles have been subject to extensive
voluntary restraint agreements between the AIT and CCNAA since
the early 1980's. 152 Suffice to state that the adverse impact of such
quotas on consumer welfare has been well demonstrated.1 53 The most
recent textile agreement will expire by the end of 1989, and three
rounds of negotiations to extend it have already been held. The third
round, like the two before it, also ended in a stalemate. Disagreement
centers on the American demand to slash the quota by twelve percent.
This reduction would seriously affect apparel, the most competitive
category of Taiwan's textile exports.'
54
IV. ISSUES AND PROSPECTS OF BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS
AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN TAIWAN
A. From Reactivism to Proactivism
U.S. trade demands have been considered incessant in Taiwan.
Still, the ROC understands that reciprocal trade relations are an im-
portant element of an amicable overall relationship and that as long as
the trade imbalance cannot be corrected, it will have to deal with
American trade pressure. Trade adjustment is a difficult process for
Taiwan, especially when many issues, such as labor movements, social
welfare issues, environmental issues, and further political develop-
ments, have all converged at the same time to compel its transforma-
tion. Therefore, BTNs have been marked by emotional and
confrontational occasions. The beer, wine, and tobacco issue repre-
sented such an incident, as well as a watershed in bilateral trade
relations. 155
The American government was accused of being pressured by the
tobacco lobby in Washington, D.C. to push cigarettes to Third World
countries, including the ROC. Analogies to the Opium War were
readily made. American businesses already operating in Taiwan were
152. See Implementing Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-made Fiber
Textiles and Textile Products, I CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 226 (1981); Exchange of Letters
between the AIT and the CCNAA Concerning the Amendments and Changes of an Agreeement
Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-Made Fiber, Silk Blend and Other Vegetable Fiber Tex-
tiles and Textile Products, July 19 and Oct. 22, 1986, 6 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 415
(1986-87).
153. The best work on textile quotas imposed upon NIC's and their impact on U.S. consum-
ers is probably D. YOFFIE, POWER AND PROTECTIONISM: STRATEGIES OF THE NEWLY INDUS-
TRIALIZING COUNTRIES 43 (1983).
154. See Econ. Daily News, Nov. 13, 1989, at 1; Com. Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at 23.
155. See text accompanying notes 61-64.
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chagrined that, of all American products, cigarette exports occupied a
disproportionately important position among American trade priori-
ties toward Taiwan. There was fingerpointing on the other side, too;
the ROC government was accused of unnecessarily inciting Taiwanese
public opinion and having less than clean hands in maintaining the
monopoly system and the TTWMB, itself a cigarette producer.
The beer, wine, and tobacco experience exposed the unfairness of
unilateral trade measures such as section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act;
the Americans made the rules, acted as judges, and sought to enforce
the judgment, too. Similarly, the role of the ROC government in the
sale and distribution of these products also spurred outcries for priva-
tization and the restructuring of TTWMB into a privately held com-
pany. Since the U.S. will only intensify its use of unilateral trade
retaliatory laws in the future, the ROC in recent years has gradually
realized the importance of becoming more proactive in dealing with
American trade initiatives and readjusting its domestic economy.
56
One example of this proactive approach is the Detailed Action
Plan for Strengthening Economic and Trade Ties with the United
States ["Action Plan"]. 57 Admittedly, the specter of further protec-
tionist pressure following the 1988 Trade Act prompted the Action
Plan. 58 The ROC, however, has set forth in the Action Plan not only
short-term responses to U.S. trade initiatives, but also means and
schedules for long-term adjustment of the entire economy as a part of
its trade policy toward the United States. The Plan will seek compre-
hensive solutions to bilateral trade issues, rather than piecemeal reso-
lution of individual difficulties. 59
Reflecting such a proactive trade policy, the Action Plan boldly
sets forth quantitative goals to be reached; the ROC is committed to
the aim of reducing its total trade surplus from ten percent of the
GNP in 1988 to four percent of the GNP by 1992, and reducing its
trade surplus with the United States by ten percent each year.' 60 The
Plan will also strive to reduce the proportion of exports to the U.S. to
about one-third of its total exports.' 6' It will continue to implement
the tariff reduction program, focusing on categories in which Ameri-
can products are more competitive or in which the United States has
156. For a journalistic critique of the ROC's trade reactivism, see Com. Times, Nov. 12,
1989, at 3.
157. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 145, at 12.
158. See id. at 1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. In 1988, exports to the United States represented 38.7 percent of the total exports.
See FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2.
[Vol. 11:326
US.-Taiwan Trade
expressed an interest.1 62 By 1992, the average effective duty rate will
be reduced to 3.5 percent from the 1988 average rate of 5.66 percent
and the average nominal rate will be reduced to 7 percent from 12.6
percent in 1988.163 Because adjustment in the agricultural sector is
more difficult and politically more sensitive, the average nominal tariff
rate on agricultural products will decrease by 1992 only to 19.82 per-
cent compared to 5.02 percent for industrial products. 164
To diversify its export markets and reduce the share of its Ameri-
can exports relative to its total exports, the ROC has to expand its
European trade. Some improvements have been shown; the absolute
volume of its European trade has grown over the past decade.' 65 The
past ten years also saw the ROC's European trade, as a percentage of
total trade, decline for the first half of the decade but recover and in-
crease in the second half.166 According to one informal source, the
ROC should also be able to meet its Action Plan goal of reducing its
trade surplus with the United States by ten percent in 1989.167 None-
theless, the ROC will face the formidable task of achieving the same
performance in the coming years, especially if the European Economic
Community, which represents most of Taiwan's European trade, de-
velops by 1992 into a Fortress Europe with which Taiwan has fewer
ties.
Market opening is a central theme of the Action Plan. In addition
to continuing the review of various import practices which have been
challenged as restrictive, the Plan will implement an overhaul of the
import system. For example, the ROC will introduce a simplified im-
port procedure by establishing a "Negative List" designed to add
greater transparency to its import regulatory framework; only those
sectors on the Negative List, promulgated by the ROC authorities,
will be subject to the import licensing requirement. 16  For the first
time, a Trade Law will be enacted to regulate the ROC's international
162. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 145, at 1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3, 12.
165. In 1979, such trade was only about U.S. $4 billion, including U.S. $1.7 billion of imports
and U.S. $2.3 billion of imports. By 1988, total ROC-European trade had reached U.S. $17.8
billion, including U.S. $7.9 billion of imports and U.S. $9.8 billion of imports. See EURo-AsIA
TRADE ORGANIZATION, ECONOMIC PROGRESS & EUROPEAN TRADE OF REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1989, at 4 (1989).
166. Id. at 7. The ten-year scale from 1979 to 1988 was as follows: 13%, 12.6%, 11.1%,
11.4%, 11.1%, 10.4%, 10.7%, 12.5%, 14.9% and 16.2%.
167. See Com. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, at 3 (Assuming the same trend for the last two months
of 1989, this article suggests that the trade imbalance will decrease in 1989 by 10.1%, given the
fact that the first ten months of 1989 registered a U.S. $11.3 billion trade surplus).
168. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 156, at 3.
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trade practices in accordance with reciprocity and GATT
principles. 169
Realizing the ramifications of U.S. trade actions and the powerful
political sentiments resulting from the bilateral trade imbalance, the
ROC has gone out of its way to correct the imbalance. It has done
more than initiate tariff reductions and the removal of non-tariff barri-
ers. It has promoted a consistent "Buy American" policy by deliber-
ately favoring American firms where possible. For example, it has
dispatched purchasing missions to the United States at least once a
year. 170 The ROC also pays the rental cost of the American Trade
Center [ATC] in Taipei and actively sponsors U.S. import exhibitions
and product shows.
171
One of the most important consequences of the U.S. trade initia-
tives toward Taiwan has been the ROC's commitment to adjust its
economic policies and measures. Taiwan's huge trade surplus and for-
eign exchange reserves actually represent an inefficient use of resources
and require remedy through economic liberalization.1 72 As part of the
remedy, public investment in the infrastructure will.be increased. So-
cial, medical, recreational, and welfare programs will be expanded,
and efforts will be made to increase domestic demands and control
pollution. 173 American trade pressures have compelled ROC policy-
makers to redefine economic growth and proactively reset their priori-
ties. Over the long term, these American trade initiatives should
improve the competitiveness of Taiwan's products.
B. From Participant to Referee
Another important consequence of American trade initiatives to-
169. See Draft Trade Law, art. 1. The draft legislation took seven years to complete and will
be submitted to the ROC's Legislative Yuan in. early 1990. See Econ. Daily News, Nov. 11,
1989, at 7.
170. For statistics on such procurement missions, see Econ. Daily News, Nov. 11, 1989, at 7.
While the trade liberalization program continues, such procurement practice is being reviewed
by the BOFT for further improvement. Id.
171. See Memorandum of Agreement between the Coordination Council for North American
Affairs and the American Institute in Taiwan, May 10, 1985, 5 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF.
343 (1985). The ATC is a trade promotion organization operated by the AIT and situated at a
prime location in Taipei, which is quickly becoming one of the cities in the world with highest
real estate prices and rental costs.
172. See Chu, supra note 68, at 80; Prybyla, US-ROC Economic Relations Since the Taiwan
Relations Act: An American View, in ROC-U.S. RELATIONS UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS
ACT: PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS 69, 71 (King-Yuh Chang ed. 1988).
173. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 145, at 7-9. Government investment from 1989 on will
be maintained at 5% of the GNP and social insurance programs will gradually expand so that it
will increase from 14.8% of the GNP in 1989'to 15.2% of the GNP by 1992. Foreign construc-
tion companies will have opportunities to participate in public works to improve the infrastruc-
ture. Id.
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ward Taiwan has been their impact on the role of the government,
particularly the executive branch. Although government intervention
in Taiwan is much less than in South Korea and Japan, the ROC gov-
ernment still has actively participated in the domestic economy. Its
economic policies have also established a pervasive regulatory frame-
work. As trade represents a significant part of the country's GNP,
trade liberalization necessarily means domestic liberalization. As a re-
sult, the government's role is also gradually changing from an active
participant to a neutral referee to ensure that market forces will be at
work.
One indication of the gradual change in the government's role is
the plan to privatize state-owned enterprises. Although the Action
Plan asserts that state enterprises' investment in fixed assets will grad-
ually increase from 4.4 percent of the GNP in 1989 to 4.9 percent of
the GNP by 1992, the plan is actually intended to encourage invest-
ment by the private sector. 174 The Action Plan" regards the privatiza-
tion program as a means of achieving several policy goals, such as
stabilizing the overheated securities market while at the same time fi-
nancing various public welfare programs with privatization pro-
ceeds.175 Presently, this privatization program includes the three
major state-owned commercial banks and nineteen other state-owned
enterprises. In addition, nineteen other enterprises are also being re-
viewed for privatization possibilities.
176
To implement such a change in the government's role, a whole
host of existing laws and regulations had to be amended, including the
SAFE, SEL, Banking Law, Insurance Law, Copyright Law, Trade-
mark Law, Patent Law and the Statute for Investment by Foreign Na-
tionals. Similarly, new laws and regulations, such as the Fair Trade
Law, the Consumer Protection Law, 177 the Labor-Management Dis-
pute Resolution Law, 178 and Trade Law were needed to implement the
new economic policies. Therefore, this economic reform will also lead
to an eventual transformation of the legal horizons in the Republic of
China. Two examples are illustrative: the emerging trade laws and the
wider distribution of government powers over trade-related matters to
the legislature and the judiciary.
In addition to the proposed Trade Law, the Customs Law already
174. Id. at 7.
175. See id. at 8.
176. See Econ. Daily News, Nov. 12, 1989, at 2.
177. See Liu, Survey of Major Commercial Law Developments in the Republic of China: 1987-
1988, 7 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 136, 154 (1988).
178. Id. at 160.
Winter 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
provides for antidumping and countervailing duty relief.179 The Min-
istry of Finance (MOF) has also promulgated the Implementing Regu-
lations for the Assessment of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties.
Given the tariff reductions in recent years, the likelihood has increased
that foreign imports will be sold into Taiwan at less than their fair
value or will be subsidized. Several MOF investigations have already
begun. However, no assessments have been made 180 because such de-
cisions are subject to the discretion of the ROC's Executive Yuan,
which has been concerned with the possible response of Taiwan's trad-
ing partners. If the ROC is able to narrow the trade imbalance with
most of its trading partners and to expand its diplomatic and de facto
relations, then the enforcement of the trade laws will intensify. Simi-
larly, the Fair Trade Law draft and the Trade Law draft both contain
rules governing fair competition. Accordingly, one expects to see the
government changing its role to that of a neutral arbiter in a competi-
tive market. As this dispute resolution framework is being formed,
government discretion will be reduced gradually and the decision-
making process made more transparent and legalistic. The govern-
ment will behave differently.
Change in the government's role will affect the equilibrium among
the executive, legislative and judicial powers. Increased political par-
ticipation and economic liberalization in recent years have gradually
tipped the balance in favor of the legislature and the judiciary. The
ROC's Legislative Yuan has been particularly vocal with respect to
trade issues and jealous of the Executive Yuan's monopoly over the
handling of the ROC's trade relations. One indication of the legisla-.
tive uneasiness and activism is article 8 of the Trade Law draft.
Where trade negotiations and agreements necessitate amending ex-
isting laws, article 8 will require that such trade agreements not be-
come effective as binding municipal laws until the legislative process is
completed. This new provision would reverse a recent trend whereby
trade agreements concluded by the ROC's executive branch will or
would take precedence over inconsistent domestic legislation.' 8' Simi-
larly, when trade and economic issues become more legalistic, the judi-
ciary will play a more prominent role.
C. Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Unilateralism
The United States largely has taken a multilateral approach in
179. See Customs Law, arts. 46, 46-1, 46-2, 47.
180. See Com. Times, Feb. 23, 1989.
181. See cases and copyright rulings cited supra notes 13 and 100.
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trade initiatives. As a non-GATT member that follows GATT princi-
ples, the ROC will have to extend concessions to other trading part-
ners whenever such concessions are made to the United States. In the
ROC, multilateralism means unilateral concessions to multiple trading
partners without reciprocal concessions. Moreover, as far as the ma-
jority of its trading partners are concerned, the ROC's trade relations
are bilateral at best; some trading partners such as the EEC would
simply piggyback on American trade initiatives. When the United
States uses section 301 as a threat of retaliation, the trade relationship
is actually unilateral; the U.S. dictates what it wants. Accordingly,
GATT re-entry has become a major trade policy objective of the Re-
public of China. The government announced on January 4, 1990 that
it had applied for accession to the GATT with its Secretariat under the
name of the customs territories of Taiwan, Pescadores (Peng-Hu Is-
lands) and Quemoy (Kingmen and Matsu Islands).18
2
Taiwan's trade initiatives toward the United States in the BTNs
have not resulted in much affirmative response. For example, the
ROC has argued for years that pursuant to the spirit of the 1979 trade
agreement, a mechanism for the settlement of trade disputes should be
established. 8 3 Thus far, the United States has not been responsive to
this request. One does not see any technical issues that will prevent
the creation of such a mechanism. Quite to the contrary, examples of
such bilateral trade dispute resolution mechanisms abound. One re-
cent example is the bi-national trade arbitration panel between the
United States and Canada which was part of the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Area [FTA] Agreement.184 Ironically, American intransigence
on a simple notion of fair play and due process as reflected in the
American position on a dispute resolution mechanism is flatly repug-
nant to its own clarion call for "a level playing field."
Another ROC aspiration based on bilateralism is to conclude an
FTA agreement with the United States. This task is more formidable
than seeking to establish dispute resolution mechanisms; it seeks to
address all substantive trade issues at one time. The ROC has devoted
much effort to persuading American policy makers and influencing
182. Liu, Formal Application to the GATT Made by the ROC, Econ. Daily News, Jan. 5,
1990, at 1.
183. For the 1979 trade agreement, see supra text accompanying note 22; see also ACTION
PLAN, supra note 145, at 10.
184. For a discussion of such bilateral panel, see Anderson & Rugman, The Canada-US.
Free Trade Agreement; A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 13
WORLD COMPETITION L. & EcON. REV. 43 (1989).
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American public opinion. 8 5 The Action Plan suggests that the ROC
will continue to pursue the FTA proposal with the United States.'
8 6
In contrast to its proposal for setting up dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, Taiwan's FTA proposal has already received some attention
from the executive branch of the United States and the International
Trade Commission [ITC], which submitted a report [FTA Report] in
compliance with a Congressional request on the pros and cons of con-
cluding FTA agreements with Taiwan, South Korea, ASEAN coun-
tries, or the Pacific Rim countries in general. t8 7
The FTA Report, however, is nothing but an assemblage of sub-
mitted comments arguing for or against concluding FTA agreements
with the United States' trading partners in the region. In short, the
Report concluded that an FTA agreement with the ROC would have
many advantages. First, it would avoid a piecemeal approach to han-
dling trade disputes. Second, it would add more predictability and less
acrimony to the bilateral trade relations. Third, it would help rectify
the bilateral trade imbalance. Fourth, it would grant the U.S. exclu-
sive and yet GATT-consistent trade benefits in a market where compe-
tition with Japanese firms has been keen. Fifth, U.S. imports would
gain greater access to Taiwan at a relatively low cost, in lightof the
favorable position enjoyed by U.S. firms in such a regional market.
Sixth, it would create a necessary forum for BTN's with Taiwan,
which is not a GATT member.' 8
8
The FTA Report also listed several perceived disadvantages of an
FTA agreement with Taiwan. First, it is unnecessary since the current
approach is already effective in persuading the ROC to make trade
concessions. Second, an FTA agreement with Taiwan would not end
bilateral trade issues. Third, concluding such an agreement would en-
able Taiwan to seek an exception to section 301 actions or special
treatment in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. Fourth, the
negotiating process would be long and difficult. Fifth, it would pro-
vide only limited benefits to American firms as Taiwan's market is
relatively small. Sixth, both sides would want to make exceptions to
certain sensitive sectors (such as agricultural products by the ROC
and footwear and textiles by the United States). Finally, the FTA Re-
port suggested that Taiwan's real motivation could be to seek defacto
185. See, e.g., THE U.S.-REPUBLIC OF CHINA TRADE RELATIONSHIP: TIME FOR A NEW
STRATEGY (R. Brooks ed. 1988) [hereinafter NEW STRATEGY].
186. ACTION PLAN, supra note 145, at 10.
187. The Pros and Cons of Entering into Negotiations on Free Trade Area Agreements with
Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN, or the Pacific Rim Region in General, USITC
Pub. 2166, Inv. No. TA-332-259 (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter FTA Report].
188. Id. at vi.
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diplomatic recognition and questioned the availability of legal means
to enter into negotiations with Taiwan.
8 9
To be sure, Taiwan would receive both political and economic
gains by concluding an FTA agreement with the United States. De
facto diplomatic recognition, however, could not be one such gain be-
cause the Executive branch of the American government has recog-
nized the PRC. Meanwhile, the American judiciary has already
granted de facto judicial recognition to Taiwan under the Taiwan Re-
lations Act.190 Signing an FTA agreement, therefore, should not add
or subtract anything from this judicially recognized relationship. In
addition, the TRA essentially requires Taiwan to be treated as a coun-
try for the purposes of U.S. law.t91 Therefore, negotiating an FTA
agreement with Taiwan should not pose more legal obstacles relative
to other BTNs. In fact, questioning the validity of an FTA agreement
runs directly counter to the multitude of trade and other agreements
already concluded between the AIT and the CCNAA since the pas-
sage of the TRA in 1979.
Disappointingly, the FTA Report failed to weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of concluding such an agreement. Furthermore,
some of the disadvantages listed in the FTA Report do not even per-
suade this author. For example, one questions the wisdom of recom-
mending against an FTA agreement merely because "it would not end
trade disputes."' 92 That argument flies in the face of the U.S.-Canada
FTA Agreement, which has a dispute resolution chapter. One of the
goals of an FTA agreement is to resolve disputes; no trade agreement
or trade legislation can ever prevent bilateral trade issues from arising.
This line of argument is viciously circular and totally unpersuasive.
The argument that an FTA agreement would exempt Taiwan from
certain special provisions of the U.S. trade laws is also circular and
unpersuasive. First, the existence of an FTA agreement does not
mean imports will be entirely exempt from these trade laws. It would
only provide certain procedural safeguards. By presenting this. situa-
tion as a disadvantage, the FTA Report is really suggesting that trade
legislation should be preserved or applied in such a way so as to pre-
vent free trade.193
189. Id. at vi-vii.
190. See cases cited, supra, notes 14, 30.
191. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 3303, 3305, 3309, 3311, 3314 (West 1989).
192. FTA Report, supra note 187, at 1-8.
193. Id. at 1-8, 1-9. In fact, the FTA Report concedes that "Taiwan might not seek exemp-
tion to section 301 since presumably the FTA would eliminate the barriers that 301 normally
fights." Id. at 1-9.
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Equally unpersuasive is the argument that the benefits of an FTA
agreement would be limited due to the small size of Taiwan's market.
The FTA Report stated: "To support this view, [some U.S. trade offi-
cials] pointed to the relatively small size of Taiwan's market (twenty
million) and said that many areas of interest to the United States -
such as agricultural products and services - would most likely be
exempted, at least initially, from an ETA.
194
When market access is the issue, Taiwan's huge foreign exchange
reserves are mentioned instead of its small population. t9 The actual
record of increased market-opening in the agricultural and services
sectors also refutes the wisdom of this argument. Trade in agriculture
and services is being liberalized. Finally, one should not lose sight of
the fact that a ten-year program was contemplated under the U.S.-
Canada FTA Agreement to gradually phase in an integrated FTA
arrangement.
The real "disadvantage" of an FTA agreement with Taiwan was
not touched upon in the FTA report since the ITC is not the appropri-
ate agency to address this issue. Simply stated, from the American
perspective, the real disadvantage resides in the possible adverse con-
sequences of antagonizing the PRC. 196 Admittedly, the Tiananmen
military crackdown in June, 1989 has strained U.S.-PRC relations.
But it remains to be seen how international politics instead of funda-
mental economics Will affect the feasibility of an FTA agreement be-
tween the United States and Taiwan.
While the ROC will continue to pursue the FTA proposal with the
United States, it has recently intensified its efforts to rejoin the
GATT. 197 The BOFT is drafting a memorandum on the trading sys-
tem of Taiwan as well as other documents for GATT application and
efforts have been made to seek the support of industrialized nations
such as the U.S., EEC, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. 98 The
Action Plan specifically requests the United States to support the
ROC's "participation in international economic and trade activi-
194. Id. at 1-10.
195. The U.S. is rumored to have requested that Taiwan participate in the Brady Plan to
resolve the Third World debt crisis. The ROC is rumored to be receptive to the proposal and
there have been speculations of contact with Latin American authorities already. See United
Evening News, Nov. 11, 1989, at 2.
196. A seasoned trade practitioner and former USTR official has suggested that a rigorous
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of an FTA arrangement will not be made until the
political decision is made. See Remarks of Herbert Shelly in NEW STRATEGY, supra note 185, at
9.
197. See, e.g., Econ. Daily News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 1.
198. Id.
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ties."' 99 The ROC is prepared to offer quid pro quo and fulfill its
international obligations as a maturing trading partner.2° ° Again, de-
cisions will not be made on the basis of economic and reciprocal prin-
ciples alone.
Political issues relating to the GATT application will have to be
addressed first. The PRC's position and reactions of other countries
will be important factors. The fact that GATT contemplates customs
territories and not necessarily sovereignty as a standard for accession
may be advantageous to Taiwan. In any event, continued implementa-
tion of Taiwan's trade and economic liberalization program will en-
hance its possibility of being admitted. Such a program and economic
assistance provided to its trading partners should also improve its ex-
ternal relations over the long term.
Similarly, one should not discount the Significance of unilateral
trade "concessions" resulting from the ROC's adjustment of its econ-
omy and trade policies. Without incentives such as an FTA agree-
ment with the United States or accession to the GATT, the economic
adjustment process could proceed at a slower pace. As shown above,
however, the adjustment now is not merely a response to appease trad-
ing partners such as the United States. Instead, Taiwan has discov-
ered the benefits of affirmatively seeking such adjustment as a means of
upgrading its . industries and enhancing their international
competitiveness.
D. Concerns for Dangerous Tendencies
Trade has to be a two-way relationship. As the party that has en-
joyed a huge trade surplus with the U.S., Taiwan understands this re-
lationship and, consequently, has been receptive to American trade
initiatives. Perhaps the same reason explains why Japan, which in
turn enjoys a huge trade surplus with Taiwan, has been relatively reti-
cent about the ROC's trade measures that often favor American firms
at the expense of Japanese firms. Meanwhile, the nature of ROC-U.S.
trade relations has become more legalistic in recent years. Examples
include issues involving intellectual property rights; market opening
measures such as securities, insurance, and banking; and export con-
trol measures such as the proposed technology export controls.
Therefore, one cause for concern is the lack of any procedural frame-
work governing the resolution of substantive trade issues.
199. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 145, at 10.
200. One example is that an Overseas Economic Cooperation and Development Fund with a
budget of N.T. $30 billion (about U.S. $1.2 billion) has been earmarked for providing financial
assistance to developing countries in the development of their economies. Id. at 6.
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This concern explains why ROC trade negotiators have persist-
ently requested their American counterparts to set up dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms. If the U.S. believes its substantive trade initiatives
are fair, then it should be prepared to permit an impartial procedural
review of its claims of fairness when a dispute arises. Section 301 and
the related retaliatory apparatus under American trade legislation
should be examined in this light. One should find fault with section
301 not primarily because of its retaliatory nature or because its retali-
ation may aim at other sectors of the targeted economy. Instead, the
cardinal fault of section 301 is that procedurally it makes U.S. trade
negotiators both the judge and the jury.
Notions of fair play and procedural due process are not foreign to
Americans. In fact, such notions have been constitutionally enshrined
in their case law. 20 1 To be sure, trade negotiations have never been
exalted to a level demanding constitutional sanctimony. However,
such procedural safeguards need not exceed those accorded under the
GATT. 20 2 These safeguards will also fill the void created by the diffi-
culty in seeking dispute resolution in the International Court of Justice
pursuant to article XXVIII of the FCN Treaty.20 3 The records ex-
amined in this article have shown both Taiwan's responsiveness to
U.S. substantive trade initiatives and American footdragging on Tai-
wan's proposal for the establishment of a procedural framework. This
phenomenon is a dangerous tendency in bilateral trade relations.
Another concern in the further development of bilateral trade rela-
tions relates to the high-handed approach with which the United
States has sought to implement its trade benefits. One example is the
tacit American pressure for more intensified judicial enforcement of
the protection of intellectual property rights.2°4 The pressure has been
such that the ROC's trade negotiators now have to provide monthly
statistics of enforcement performance to their American counterparts
and the ROC's judiciary has to request its judges to mete out more
severe sentences in infringement cases. 205 One should realize that the
result of this anti-infringement campaign in the ROC is that judicial
enforcement of intellectual property rights has improved. More im-
portantly, in terms of both statistics and the prevailing mood in Tai-
201. See, e.g., the seminal case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), involving the
constitutionally guaranteed right of hearing as a matter of procedural due process.
202. See GATT, supra note 15, arts. XXII, XXIII.
203. See text accompanying note 17.
204. A form of such pressure involves holding seminars on the protection of intellectual
property rights for judges and prosecutors in Taiwan.
205. See text accompanying note 94.
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wan, it is no longer merely "foreigners versus us."' 206 It may be a
legitimate exercise of American power to use its trade initiatives to
influence the amendment of various intellectual property laws in Tai-
wan. In any event, the executive and legislative functions involved in
such a process are more political in nature than the judiciary func-
tions. However, the Taiwanese authorities will want to avoid any im-
pression that American pressure has determined the appropriate level
of judicial enforcement of intellectual property law in Taiwan.
V. CONCLUSION
During the past decade, U.S.-Taiwan trade volume and trade rela-
tions have rapidly expanded. For the most part, trade relations have
been amicable. Even though the bilateral trade imbalance is largely a
result of structural differences in the two economies, the ROC has set
forth ambitious goals in its Action Plan to remedy the trade imbal-
ance. Importantly, it has become widely accepted in Taiwan that eco-
nomic liberalization and changing the role of the government in the
economy should be goals of national development, rather than means
of appeasing international protectionist sentiments. While the ROC
should continue both to transform its economy internally and to re-
spond simultaneously to substantive American trade initiatives, the
United States should be more responsive to Taiwan's procedural trade
initiatives as well. Although assisting Taiwan to rejoin the GATT and
concluding an FTA agreement with Taiwan will require more effort
and commitment, the U.S. can immediately embark on the less de-
manding task of providing for a bilateral forum for dispute resolution.
At the policy level, American trade initiatives will have far reach-
ing impact on the transformation of Taiwan's economy. Likewise,
laws and regulations enacted, amended, or adopted to implement re-
sults of the BTN's are already changing the contours of the legal hori-
zons in Taiwan. In the long run, the ROC should emerge more
competitive in the international marketplace. Since a pattern has al-
ready been developed for dealing with even the thorniest trade issues,
one could be cautiously optimistic of the continued expansion of ami-
cable and prosperous trade relations between the United States and
Taiwan in the decade to come.
206. For statistics suggesting there are fewer infringement cases involving American owners,
see supra note 94.
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